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I n t r o d u c t i o n
he disintegration of the U.S.S.R. and col-
lapse of the communist system made sig-
nificant changes to the geopolitical map of
the world. States with similar characteristics
rooted in the relatively recent historical past
have appeared in the post-Soviet expanse. These
states do not have a multitude of state institutions
and have inherited the distorted system of the
command economy. Since they have no experi-
ence in state independence, these countries, in
addition to the numerous unresolved domestic
tasks, have also found themselves faced with
problems caused by the expanding dimensions
of globalization.
Globalization is characterized today by the
creation of regional unions of states with similar
interests, thus making it easier for these coun-
tries to reach common goals through joint ef-
forts.
A variety of different regional unions of
the former Soviet republics have formed in the
territory of the disintegrated U.S.S.R. And it is
interesting that these formations are far from al-
ways limited to the post-Soviet expanse. On the
contrary, it has become a priority for many of the
former Union republics to become members of
interstate unions that existed even before the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union, such as NATO and the
EU. Whereas this proved a very manageable task
for the Baltic states, other countries are still en-
countering a multitude of obstacles and unre-
solved issues as they attempt to gain membership
in these unions.
More than ten years ago, Georgia, Ukraine,
Azerbaijan, and Moldova created the regional
international organization called GUAM, which
is an institutional entity designed to find com-
mon interests and coordinate joint action plans.
The fact that this structure has existed for many
years shows that each country individually, as
well as the organization they represent as a
whole still have many unresolved problems. At
present, the question of strengthening and devel-
oping GUAM is particularly urgent, and it is a
priority not only for the states that belong to this
structure, but also for the West, the interests of
which in the post-Soviet expanse are largely re-
lated to the interests of GUAM.
GUAM’s development might be success-
fully promoted by means of the “Caucasian Tan-
dem”1  of Azerbaijan and Georgia, which has al-
ready largely shown its efficacy and efficiency in
resolving many problems that affect the interests
of these Caucasian republics.
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Fragmentation of
the Post-Soviet Geopolitical Space and
GUAM
The collapse of the U.S.S.R. triggered not only the historical process of the formation of inde-
pendent states, but also of regional political and economic unions in the post-Soviet expanse. The first
of them was the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which encompasses almost the entire
territory of the former Soviet Union (with the exception of the Baltic countries). Many experts al-
ready agree, to one extent or another, that this structure, which was institutionalized into an interna-
tional regional organization, is not making a sufficient contribution to the integration processes.2  One
of the main reasons for this is the continued restriction of the integration processes to the framework
of the CIS along the same lines as the closed nature of production cooperation that characterized the
Soviet economic system.3  It is also important that Russia’s economic interests today are related more
to other entities of the world economy than to the CIS: Russia’s main sales markets are not within the
Commonwealth, but beyond its boundaries, since the CIS accounts for only 15% of Russia’s foreign
trade turnover.4  In other words, for the Russian Federation, the Commonwealth is a “legless” organ-
ization that will not go anywhere, so Russia can afford to direct its attention to more economically
attractive regions, secure in the knowledge that it always has the CIS within its reach. Moreover, the
Russian Federation itself has its own priorities within the CIS, where interrelations with some of its
members have been raised to the rank of strict priorities (for example, Russia regards Armenia as its
strategic partner and even outpost in the Caucasus),5  while others, such as Georgia, has been coined
as a so-called Russian CIS outcast, with respect to which Moscow introduced tough visa conditions,
closed its markets to the republic’s products, cancelled air and postal communication, and even took
the liberty of persecuting ethnic Georgians living in the Russian Federation.
In order to clarify the essence of the “Cau-
casian Tandem” and define its role in strengthen-
ing and developing GUAM, it would be expedi-
ent to at least briefly describe the fragmentation
processes of the geopolitical space occurring in
the post-Soviet expanse.
2
 See, for example: R. Grinberg, L. Zevin, et al., 10 let Sodruzhestva nezavisimykh gosudarstv: illiuzii, razocharov-
aniia, nadezhdy, RAS Institute of International Economics and Political Research, Moscow, 2001; L. Kozik, P. Kokhno,
SNG: realii i perspektivy, Yuridicheskiy mir BK Publishing House, Moscow, 2001; V. Shulga (head of a group of au-
thors), Ekonomika SNG: 10 let reformirnovaniia i integratsionnogo razvitiia, Finstatinform, Moscow, 2001; N. Shum-
skiy, Sotrudnichestvo nezavisimykh gosudarstv: problemy i perspektivy razvitiia, Tekhnoprint, Minsk, 2001; idem, “Eko-
nomicheskaia integratsiia gosudarstv Sodruzhestva: vozmozhnosti i perspektivy,” Voprosy ekonomiki, No. 6, 2003; idem,
“Obshchee ekonomicheskoe prostranstvo gosudarstv Sodruzhestva: optimalny format,” Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhd-
unarodnye otnosheniia, No. 2, 2004.
3
 See, for example: B. Coppieters, “The Failure of Regionalism in Eurasia and the Western Ascendancy over
Russia’s Near Abroad,” in: Commonwealth and Independence in Post-Soviet Eurasia, ed. by B. Coppieters, A. Zverev,
D. Trenin, FRANK CASS PUBLISHERS, London, 1998, pp. 194-197; M.B. Olcott, A. Åslund, Sh.W. Garnett, Getting it
Wrong: Regional Cooperation and the Commonwealth of Independent States, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, Washington, 1999.
4
 See: L. Vardomskiy, “Integratsionnyy proekt: byt’ ili ne byt’?” Novosti-Moldova Information Agency, 9 July,
2007, available at [http://www.newsmoldova.ru/print_version.html?nws_id=634258].
5
 See, for example: F. Cameron, J.M. Domaski, “Russian Foreign Policy with Special Reference to its Western
Neighbors,” EPC (European Policy Center) Issue Paper, No. 37, 2005, available at [http://www.epc.eu/TEWN/pdf/
354600757_EPC%20Issue%20Paper%2037%20Russian%20Foreign%20Policy.pdf]; T. Liloyan, “Armenia-Russia’s Out-
post in South Caucasus—Duma Speaker,” ArmenianDiaspora.com, 15 December, 2004, available at [http://www.
armeniandiaspora.com/archive/16794.html].
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All of this promoted gradual fragmentation of the post-Soviet geopolitical space. Special men-
tion should be made of the Customs Union in the CIS, to which Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyr-
gyzstan, and Tajikistan belong. The member states of this structure went on to form an interstate or-
ganization called the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC). Uzbekistan joined it in January
2006. In 2003, Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus signed a treaty on the formation of a Single
Economic Space (SES). It is worth noting that the experience of the first years testifies to the exist-
ence of a whole slew of contradictions among the integrating states caused primarily by incompatibil-
ity of their interests.6
In 2002, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan created the Central Asian Coop-
eration Organization (CACO), which Russia also joined in October 2004.
The possibility of forming a Russia-Belarus Union State has been discussed for several years
now, but implementation of this project is hindered by the failure of the sides to reach a common
understanding about the structure of this entity: according to the Russian view, Belarus should join
Russia as a federal district, while Belarus sees the Union State as a confederation.7
In October 1997, four countries—Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova—created the
GUAM organization, which Uzbekistan joined in April 1999, thus changing the name of this structure
to GUUAM. In May 2005, GUUAM once again became GUAM due to Uzbekistan’s withdrawal
from it. In May 2006, GUAM was transformed into an international formation called the Organiza-
tion for Democracy and Economic Development—GUAM (ODED-GUAM).
In addition to these transnational structures, the states of the post-Soviet expanse are members
of various international unions (for example, the EU, NATO, BSECO, and SCO), to which countries
other than the post-Soviet states also belong.
Creation of the listed transnational regional organizations in the post-Soviet expanse shows
that significant fragmentation has occurred today in this geopolitical area. According to Stanislav
Belkovskiy, the founder of the Institute of National Strategy of Ukraine and Russia, an integrated
post-Soviet expanse no longer exists as a geopolitical phenomenon, rather three post-Soviet ex-
panses have appeared in its place: the western part of the former U.S.S.R., where the informal lead-
er is Ukraine (which GUAM theoretically also serves), Russia and Belarus, and the so-called South
Asian part, where the role of informal leader belongs to Kazakhstan.8  Despite the fact that this
particular breakdown of the post-Soviet geopolitical space is open to discussion, we must neverthe-
less understand that the actual fact of this territorial fragmentation is beyond doubt. And it is impor-
tant to realize that Russia itself is the direct or indirect initiator of this process to one degree or
another.
The post-Soviet states that are more loyal to Russian policy “deserve,” so to speak, more at-
tention from the Russian Federation, and it, in turn, enters into various unions with them keeping
the degree of this loyalty in mind. At times, the ideological “formalization” of this process gives
rise to a certain amount of misunderstanding. For example, when Russia became a member of
CACO in 2004, the question of its being recognized as a Central Asian state was discussed.9  Fol-
lowing this logic, Turkmenistan should be excluded from the Central Asian states, since it does not
belong to CACO. In other words, the membership status of a particular state in a particular regional
6
 See, for example: R. Ultanbaev, “Eurasian Economic Community: Thorny Path of Development,” Central Asia
and the Caucasus, No. 3 (21), 2003, pp. 135-137; idem, “Eurasian Economic Community in New Integration Condi-
tions,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 4 (40), 2006, pp. 38-40.
7
 See, for example: L. Vardomskiy, op. cit.
8
 See: “Dlia chego nuzhen GUAM?” UNIAN, 19 May, 2006, available at [http://www.unian.net/news/print.
php?id=155187].
9
 See: F. Tolipov, “Russia in Central Asia: Retreat, Retention, Or Return?” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 5 (47),
2007, p. 19.
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organization cannot be used as the only criterion for defining whether that state is located in a par-
ticular region or not.
Of all the purely post-Soviet international unions, only GUAM arouses unconcealed irritation
among Russian politicians and experts, who believe it not simply to be an anti-Russian project orches-
trated by the U.S. in the post-Soviet expanse,10  but even a “branch” of NATO in the CIS,11  although
it is entirely possible that Moscow will gradually have to reconcile itself to GUAM’s existence.12
We are deeply convinced that Russia itself prompted the countries belonging to GUAM to cre-
ate this transnational regional organization. As Chairman of the Center for the Study of Political
Values Oles Doniy correctly noted, each of the post-Soviet republics by itself is much weaker than
Russia, and, consequently, the latter has (and if necessary uses) strong levers of pressure on them, so
GUAM is an institution of resistance to Russian pressure on the countries belonging to this union.13
Three of the four GUAM states have serious problems with territorial integrity. Russia directly
(in Georgia and Moldova) or indirectly (in Azerbaijan) supports the regimes of the separatist territo-
ries; the Russian Federation also supports the separatist manifestations in eastern Ukraine, not to
mention the Crimea. Moscow uses the territorial problems of these countries as a way to keep them
under its political control.
Deliveries of energy resources play just as important a role in putting pressure on Georgia,
Ukraine, and Moldova for Russia. This particularly applies to gas, the tariff policy for which is deter-
mined by Moscow’s political interests in these particular states.
In all likelihood, GUAM arouses the Kremlin’s irritation because four post-Soviet countries had
the audacity to create an international union without inviting Russia, and in so doing they are clearly
declaring their support of pro-Western values.
GUAM Secretary General Valery Chechelashvili justifiably notes that GUAM is an open or-
ganization, and any state of the region can apply to join it.14  It is theoretically possible that the Rus-
sian Federation will want to become a member of GUAM, and its membership in what will then be
GURAM (Georgia-Ukraine-Russia-Azerbaijan-Moldova) will mean that Moscow will also use this
transnational structure in its interests. In this case, it can be presumed with one-hundred-percent prob-
ability that the above-mentioned criticism (at times even malicious) by Russian politicians and ex-
perts of this union will not only stop, but arguments will be heard about its prospects.
Boris Nemtsov correctly noted that the creation of GUAM was not aimed against the Kremlin,
but against “dictatorial imperial Russia,” whereas democratic Russia, which will not have conflicts
with the GUAM countries, has a real possibility of integrating into this union.15
At present, it is in Russia’s interests for GUAM to be weak. The Russian-Moldovan talks on
reinstating deliveries of wine from Moldova to the Russian market are being viewed in this context,
not to mention the next round of talks on the Transnistrian problem, as a result of which pro-Russian
experts are concluding the Chisinau will repeat Tashkent’s experience and GUAM will be shortened
by still one more letter.16
10
 See, for example: S. Shakariants, “Sanitarniy kordon protiv Rossii,” KVKZ.ru. Novosti Kavkaza, 29 June, 2007,
available at [http://kvkz.ru/2007/06/29/sanitarnyjj_kordon_protiv_rossii.html].
11
 See, for example: V. Yakubian, “GUAM protiv Rossii—bakinskiy raund,” REGNUM Information Agency, 23 June,
2007, available at [http://www.regnum.ru/news/issues/847166.html].
12
 See: “Ukraina: Rossia smirilas s sushchestvovaniem GUAM,” Noviy region 2, 16 June, 2007, available at [http://
www.nr2.ru/pmr/124345.html].
13
 See: “Dlia chego nuzhen GUAM?”
14
 See: A. Getmanchuk, “Gensek GUAM Valeriy Chechelashvili: ‘Kazhdaia iz chetyrekh stran—lider,’” Glavred,
18 June, 2007, available at [http://glavred.info/print.php?article=/archive/2007/06/18/171626-1.html].
15
 See: “Nemtsov prognoziruet ekonomicheskoe razvitie stran ODER-GUAM,” ForUM, 24 May, 2005, available at
[http://for-ua.com/ukraine/2006/05/24/161820.html].
16
 See: V. Iakubian, op. cit.
CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS (Special  Issue) No. 3-4(51-52), 2008
51
No matter what, GUAM’s future will largely depend on the extent to which the states belonging
to it will be of interest both to Europe and the West as a whole, as well as to their direct neighbors with
respect to using this international organization as a tool for developing mutual beneficial cooperation
in the region.
Why the “Caucasian Tandem”?
When talking about GUAM’s economic prospects, it should be noted that the economies of the
countries belonging to it are still insufficiently interrelated, since deliveries to the GUAM states ac-
count for only 3-14% of the total export of the countries in this union.17  The free trade area to be cre-
ated,18  not to mention a GUAM common market, a discussion of which has only just begun in the
Foreign Minister Council of this structure,19  is not likely to yield fruit any time soon. Therefore, in
addition to common political interests, the implementation of large economic projects of interest not
only to the GUAM member states, but also to other states and their unions from a wider area, is cur-
rently acquiring special importance.
Due to the small size of three of the GUAM states, Ukraine is usually considered its informal
leader.20
On the other hand, due to its large supplies of hydrocarbon resources,21  Azerbaijan has special
significance in GUAM, since in addition to everything else it is located on the transportation corridor
that connects Europe to Asia. In this respect, we will note that the increase in rates of Azerbaijan’s
economic development was mainly caused by the increase in oil production and progress in the oil
refining industry. The other three GUAM republics (Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine) are in urgent
need of energy resources, and each of them faces the task of decreasing its energy dependence on
Russia, which, as was indicated above, is trying to take maximum advantage of the energy factor to
place increasing political pressure on the leadership of these countries.22
When we talk about the small size of three of the GUAM states, we should keep in mind that in
the burgeoning globalization processes, the size of the relevant market becomes significantly less
important for the successful development of any country (including a small one): globalization pro-
motes the unification of markets, and if a state is sufficiently open,23  regardless of how large its ter-
ritory or how big its population, the market of this state can become a part of the united markets in
question.24
17
 See: L. Grigoriev, M. Salikhov, GUAM—piatnadtsat let spustia. Sdvigi v ekonomike Gruzii, Ukrainy, Azerbaid-
zhana i Moldavii, 1991-2006, REGNUM, Moscow, 2007, p. 9, available at [http://www.fief.ru/content/32/1/GUAM.pdf].
18
 See, for example: “GUAM—zona svobodnoi torgovli,” 24 May, 2006, available at [http://www.kroufr.ru/forum/
index.php?PHPSESSID=2549b383f4445d14978df84d46c00a55&topic=1285.msg3270#msg3270].
19
 See: Communiqué of the GUAM Baku Summit, GUAM, 18 June, 2007, p. 3, available at [http://www.mfa.md/
img/docs/baku_communique.doc].
20
 See, for example: V. Stepanov, B. Burkinskiy, GUAM: problemy i perspektivy razvitiia v kontekste natsional-
nykh interesov Ukrainy, Institute of Market Problems and Economic-Environmental Research, Ukrainian National Acade-
my of Sciences, Odessa, 2001.
21
 See: I. Aliev, Kaspiiskaia neft Azerbaidzhana, Izvestia Publishers, Moscow, 2003.
22
 For more about this problem with respect to Ukraine, see, for example: R. Götz, “Ukraine and Belarus: Their
Energy Dependence on Russia and their Roles as Transit Countries,” in: The New Eastern Europe: Ukraine, Belarus,
Moldova, ed. by D. Hamilton, G. Mangott, Center for Transatlantic Relations, Washington, DC, 2007.
23
 See, for example: Policymaking in the Open Economy. Concepts and Case Studies in Economic Performance,
ed. by R. Dornbush, The World Bank, Washington, 1993.
24
 See: A. Alesina, “It’s the Size of the Market, not the Country that Counts,” Project Syndicate, December 1998,
available at [http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/ale1].
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Due to the relative underdevelopment of the national economies of the GUAM republics and,
consequently, their low competitiveness on the international markets, it is especially important for the
economic entities of these states to cooperate with each other in order to concentrate joint efforts on
creating prerequisites for rapid and sustainable development. In other words, there is an urgent need
to search for ways to establish a system of strategic economic partnership, and not simply coopera-
tion. Only joint efforts will make it easier to find common spheres in the region, into which foreign
investments can be pumped.
The future of GUAM’s economic development largely depends on streamlining the transport
arteries of the Euro-Asian Transport-Communication Corridor (EATCC). The widely known Eu-
rope-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA)25  transportation corridor became the first practical implementa-
tion of this plan.
Today, TRACECA is regarded as a transit corridor that will supplement and develop the already
existing routes, primarily the European. In this respect, opportunities are appearing to unite the trans-
port systems of the Black, Caspian, Adriatic, and Mediterranean seas.
Resolving the question of transporting energy resources via pipelines is just as important.26  In
particular, the Azerbaijani-Georgian transportation route for early oil became the first priority large-
scale project in Georgia, which attracts large foreign investments. Moreover, implementation of this
plan created prerequisites for more active investment in other spheres of the Azerbaijani and Geor-
gian economies, not to mention raising the level of security in this region.27
On the other hand, launching the plan for transporting early oil from Azerbaijan through Russia
was very significant for the implementation of this project, since under conflict conditions, when oil
pipelines pass through hotspots or close to them, the existence of alternative pipelines is vitally im-
portant. Consequently, this example shows that not only are Azerbaijan and Georgia strategic eco-
nomic partners in the transportation of early oil, but Georgia and Russia, as well as Azerbaijan and
Russia (although unfortunately, the latter has essentially never acknowledged this) can also be re-
garded as such.
In the post-Soviet period, the Baku-Tbilisi-Supsa and Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline
projects laid the basis for economic cooperation between Azerbaijan and Georgia, as well as the
South Caucasian gas pipeline (SCG) for transporting blue fuel from the Caspian field Shah Denis;
Turkey is directly involved in the two latter projects.28
25
 See: E. Shevardnadze, Great Silk Route. TRACECA-PETrA. Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia. The
Eurasian Common Market. Political and Economic Aspects, Georgian Transport System Ltd., Tbilisi, 1999.
26
 See: F. Asadov, “Oil Caravans of the 21st Century on the Great Silk Road: What the Future has in Store for Az-
erbaijan and Kazakhstan,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 6, 2000; H. Chase, “Future Prospects of Caucasian Energy
and Transportation Corridor. The Role of Caucasian Energy Corridor in European Energy Security,” Georgian Economic
Trends, No. 3, 2002; J. DeLay, “The Caspian Oil Pipeline Tangle: A Steel Web of Confusion,” in: Oil and Geopolitics of
the Caspian Sea Region, ed. by M.P. Croissant, B. Aras, Praeger, Westport, 1999; J.H. Kalicki, “Caspian Energy at the
Crossroads,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 54, 2001; F. Müller, “Energy Development and Transport Network Coopera-
tion in Central Asia and the South Caucasus,” in: Building Security in the New States of Eurasia. Subregional Coopera-
tion in the Former Soviet Space, ed. by R. Dwan, O. Pavliuk, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, 2000; A. Rondeli, “The South Cau-
casus: Pipeline Politics and Regional Economic Interests,” in: The South Caucasus: Promoting Values Through Coopera-
tion, Seminar Report Series No. 20. Helsinki, 12-15 May, 2004, NATO Defense College, Academic Research Branch,
Rome, 2004; S.F. Starr, S.E. Cornell, “The Politics of Pipelines: Bringing Caspian Energy to Markets,” SAISPHERE,
2005; The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline: Oil Window to the West, ed. by S.F. Starr, S.E. Cornell, Uppsala University,
Uppsala, 2005; Z. Tevzadze, “Caspian Oil: Its Export Routes and Transportation Problems,” Central Asia and the Cauca-
sus, No. 1 (25), 2004.
27
 See, for example: V. Maisaia, The Caucasus-Caspian Regional Security Agenda in the 21st Century: Caspian
Oil Geopolitics and Georgia, Publishing House Global-Print, Tbilisi, 2002.
28
 See, for example: S. Caglayan, H. Mamedov, R. Medzmariashvili, et al., Regional Review: Economic, Social and
Environmental Overview of the ACG: BTC and Shah Deniz/SCP Projects in the National and Regional Context of Az-
erbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, Minimax, Baku, 2003.
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The laying and operation of the Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku railroad system will be a further
step toward intensifying economic partnership between Azerbaijan and Georgia (as well as toward
Turkey’s involvement in this process).29
All the above-mentioned projects are a graphic example of the coincidence of economic inter-
ests between two of the GUAM states—Azerbaijan and Georgia. Nevertheless, taking into account
the conflicts in the Caucasus, we can conclude that the implementation of many regional plans is es-
sentially impossible without Georgia’s participation. Consequently, the latter acts as a link through-
out almost the whole of the Caucasus.
Azerbaijan has essentially already positioned itself as the main regional transport hub,30  and is
also making serious claims to becoming a hub in banking activity, business service, the light industry,
and the storage and agricultural businesses.31  At the same time, the Baku airport also claims the role
of a transport hub for the entire Caspian region32; it is justifiably believed that in this region, Baku
could fulfill the function of a central hub and become another Dubai.33
Georgia is interested in Caspian oil and gas (and not only these resources) being transported to the
West via its territory, which is also in Azerbaijan’s economic interests, since if this happens, the route
will acquire special significance—all kinds of cargo (not only oil and gas) will travel from the East to the
West and back through its territory. The transportation of Caspian oil and gas via Georgia is raising its
role as a transport hub of energy resources.34  It can also be said that the BTC oil pipeline is endowing the
Caspian region with the function of a new European transport hub of energy resources.35  On the other
hand, Georgia’s geographic location along the transportation corridor connecting Europe and Asia
through the Caucasus has also reinforced this country’s position as a so-called transit hub.36
Different levels for manifesting the latter are known in the theory of market competition—at the
level of companies, at the level of industries, at the level of states, and at the level of regional forma-
tions. As a rule, competitors should have more or less equal economic leverage and common vectors
in defining their strategic interests, which also ensures they have the same economic claims. The
country’s competitiveness primarily depends on how productively national natural, labor, material,
and financial resources are used. At the same time, any competition prompts a striving for perfection.
If there was no international competition, the level of productivity in each individual state would
essentially not depend on the situation in other countries, while transnational flows of goods and cap-
ital open up the possibility of raising the productive use of the state’s resources and exclude the need
for independently producing all goods and services, or for specializing in those branches of the econ-
omy and segments of the market where the country is relatively more competitive.
Based on the aforesaid, the conclusion can be drawn that economically, for example, Azerbaijan and
Georgia are not strategic competitors. This is explained by the fact that Azerbaijan has oil and gas, while
29
 See: T. Ziyadov, “Officials Meet to Discuss South Caucasus Rail System,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 2, No. 232,
14 December, 2005, available at [http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2370599].
30
 See, for example: K.T. Derr, Commitment in the Caspian—A Chevron Perspective on Energy and Economic De-
velopment, Chevron Corporation, Speech to the Asia Society, 20 October, 1998, available at [http://agitprop.org.au/stop-
nato/19990524oil03.php].
31
 See: S. Escudero, “Hub for the 21st Century. Azerbaijan’s Future Role in the Caspian Basin,” Azerbaijan Inter-
national, No. 10.2, 2002.
32
 Ibidem.
33
 See: S. Escudero, “Visions of Baku. Future Hub of the Caspian,” Azerbaijan International, No. 9.3, 2001, availa-
ble at [http://www.azer.com/aiweb/categories/magazine/93_folder/93_articles/93_stanley_escudero.html].
34
 See: R. Boucher, “Opening of Caspian Basin Pipeline. United States Welcomes the Opening of Caspian Basin
Pipeline,” International Information Programs, USINFO.STATE.GOV, Europe and Eurasia, 25 May, 2005, available at
[http://usinfo.state.gov/eur/Archive/2005/May/25-468295.html].
35
 See: L. Yevgrashina, “BP Starts Work on Baku-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline,” The Turkish Times, No. 308, 1 October,
2002, available at [http://www.theturkishtimes.com/archive/02/10_01/f_ceyhan.html].
36
 See: I. Ivakhnenko, “Southern Hospitality: Caspian Exporters Encourage Infrastructure Developments in Geor-
gia,” Publications RE, 2005, available at [http://www.rusenergy.com/eng/export.htm].
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Georgia has access to the ocean and is a direct neighbor of Turkey; both republics are on the EATCC route
and each of them has its own—in some cases unique—production potential. All of this determines the fact
that Azerbaijan and Georgia cannot be regarded as rivals, rather they are strategic economic partners. In
other words, these states are creating a “Caucasian Tandem” in international competition.
At the same time, the absence of interstate economic competition between Georgia and Azerbai-
jan can in no way be perceived as the reason for the absence of market development stimuli: these
states have other rival countries, and they themselves, taken together, should be regarded as economic
partners in interregional competition. The economic partnership between Azerbaijan and Georgia can
become (which is also confirmed to a certain extent in practice) a “magnet” for drawing other entities,
both in GUAM and in the Caucasus.
In the GUAM context, the following questions are particularly important: to what extent can the
projects designed to transport Caspian energy resources to Ukraine and on to Europe be implemented
and, to be more specific, to what extent will the Odessa-Brody pipeline be used for this purpose?
At the moment, as noted above, the target of Azerbaijan’s Caspian energy resources has already
been determined. The BTC and the SCG have not only already been laid, they have also been put into
operation. Azerbaijan’s known supplies, however, do not give grounds for particular optimism with
respect to transporting them to Ukraine. In other words, the question of transporting Kazakhstan’s, as
well as Turkmenistan’s, if necessary, energy resources through the Azerbaijan-Georgian transporta-
tion corridor is up for discussion. As for the implementation of this project, it is being blocked prima-
rily by Moscow, the interests of which are in no way conducive to resolving the question of creating
alternative pipelines for delivering the Caspian’s energy resources to the West, bypassing Russia. So
we obviously have a so-called pipeline puzzle.37
The policy the U.S. and EU choose will be of special importance in resolving this problem, pri-
marily with respect to the Central Asian states and specifically Kazakhstan. In so doing, the role of the
“Caucasian Tandem” is becoming pivotal, both with respect to GUAM as a whole and with respect to
regulating the transportation of hydrocarbon resources in the westerly direction.
To sum up, the “Caucasian Tandem” is that foundation which has already been laid and on
which GUAM’s economic system can and should be built.
I n  L i e u  o f  a  C o n c l u s i o n,
or How to Strengthen GUAM?
In order to properly understand GUAM’s importance, we need to turn to the geopolitical re-
search of the Eurasian continent carried out by well-known American political scientist Zbigniew
Brzezinski, who believes that the geopolitical pivots of this vast region are Ukraine, Azerbaijan,
South Korea, Turkey, and Iran.38  The status of a geopolitical pivot39  is determined by the country’s
geographic location and the consequences of its potential vulnerability as a result of the actions of the
“active geostrategic players,”40  which are states that possess the real capability and national will to
wield power and spread influence beyond their own borders.
Two of the five geopolitical centers of Eurasia are GUAM members, which gives this union
special importance. GUAM could be significantly strengthened if such a Eurasian geopolitical center
37
 See: G. Lomsadze, “Pipeline Puzzle,” AmCham News, American Chamber of Commerce on Georgia, Issue 6,
December-January 2007-2008, available at [http://www.magazine.amcham.ge/issues/2007_6/06_2007_02.htm].
38
 See: Z. Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives, Basic Books,
New York, 1997, p. 41.
39
 Ibidem.
40
 Ibid., p. 40.
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as Turkey became more actively involved in its activity. In the event a triangle of geopolitical centers
is formed, joint projects within GUAM will become larger in scale and more effective. What is more,
if Turkey becomes more intensively involved in this union, not to mention GUAM being expanded to
form GUTAM, the first could go beyond the framework of the post-Soviet geopolitical space, which
is particularly important keeping in mind Russia’s efforts to preserve and strengthen its influence
primarily within this space.
Azerbaijan could naturally play a key role in strengthening interrelations between GUAM and
Ankara. This stands to reason if we keep in mind its ethnic, cultural, and linguistic communality with
Turkey, which will make it possible to reach common views on many international issues. Moreover,
we should keep in mind the particular friendly relations between Georgia and Ukraine, which, with
the existence and functioning of the “Caucasian Tandem,” could ensure the harmonization of interests
between the GUAM countries and Turkey.
When describing Azerbaijan with its vast hydrocarbon resources as a “cork” in the “bottle” that con-
tains the riches of the Caspian Sea and Central Asia, Zbigniew Brzezinski emphasizes that independence
of the states of the latter essentially depends on Azerbaijan’s independence from Moscow.41  This thesis,
which deserves attention, should be perceived in particular by the indicated states themselves as vitally
important, which essentially could serve as a platform for enlarging GUAM in the easterly direction.
GUAM’s future largely depends on the extent to which it succeeds in drawing Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan into this union. As for Uzbekistan, keeping in mind its relatively recent withdrawal
from GUUAM, there is no point in hoping it will return to it any time soon.
It is very important that simultaneous efforts are being made to expand GUAM’s activity in the
Turkish and Kazakhstan-Turkmen directions, which will guarantee the success of the joint projects
within the framework of this international regional union. This will balance out Turkey’s and
Ukraine’s interests regarding the transportation of energy resources.
Realization of this possibility of GUAM’s development is vitally important for the West, there-
fore the actions of the U.S. and EU, which are oriented toward enlarging the GUAM format in the
mentioned directions, should be qualitatively intensified.
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t is absolutely clear that energy policy can be
described as global if states scattered across
the globe pursue similar interests in the ener-
